During a Federation Council meeting at the end of February 2016, the representative for the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO - a region in Russia’s far north), Vadim Tyulpanov, posed a rather interesting question to Deputy Defence Minister Dmitry Bulgakov: will the Defence Ministry be redeveloping the abandoned Soviet base in the village of Amderma?
This question follows the efforts of the NAO’s governor, Igor Koshin, to request that Russian President Vladimir Putin locate units from the Defence Ministry, Border Services, and Ministry of Emergency Situations at the base in Amderma. Having units stationed there would necessitate the refurbishment of the base, which has been abandoned since 1993. Koshin’s rationale is that the village of Amderma is strategically located at the Kara Gate, geographically referred to as the Kara Strait, and allows for control of the western parts of the Northern Sea Route.
In response to both the Governor and the Senator, Bulgakov stated that the Armed Forces would be back in Amderma by 2020.
However, Russian efforts to increase their military presence have been difficult. This was particularly evident at the Cape Schmidt and Kotelny Island sites, located along Russia’s Arctic coastline, with worker discontent occurring over unpaid wages in 2015. This worker discontent caused construction delays. So while the Defence Ministry may want to re-establish the base at Amderma, is it a realistic goal?
With Russia suffering from sanctions connected to events in Ukraine, as well as the financial burden of the Kremlin’s involvement in Syria, Arctic military investment may be too much to bear. After all, Russia, as Brian Whitmore of the Power Vertical Podcast argues, is fighting a two front war. This is taking its toll on the economy, both in sustaining military operations as well as in economic growth.
While not engaged in active conflict in the north, Russia is investing heavily in military infrastructure in the Arctic. Can this investment on a third front, if a front only in the theoretical sense, be sound given the state of the economy and the announced 5% reduction in the defence budget?
The answer is not so simple. With sovereignty, economic, and security interests in the Arctic, Russia must make investments. Russia’s claims for the Northern Sea Route being internal waters, coupled with the latest Arctic search and rescue agreement necessitates Russia being ready to respond in the North to meet international obligations. The required infrastructure development to meet these obligations does not have to be strictly, or even predominantly, military. Civilian-use infrastructure will aid in longer term plans for economic development, as well as search and rescue operations.
Speaking strictly strategically, control over the Kara Gate is all well and good. However, when looking at a map, this is quite an isolated region. For a threat to get to this point, that threat would have to sail past the Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet is located. That is, of course, unless they take the long way to the Kara Sea, at which point control over the Kara Gate becomes irrelevant. On this route, the enemy would have to contend with the Pacific Fleet and various bases along the eastern reaches of the Northern Sea Route in order to reach Amderma.
Say what you will of Russian actions internationally elsewhere in the world, their involvement within the Arctic has routinely been within the bounds of international law and no more provocative than other Arctic nations.
Amderma’s refurbishment seems to be borne from a desire to project power and sovereignty in the Arctic and reinforce the Northern Sea Route as Russia’s internal waters. This is an important part of Russia’s Arctic strategy. But at the same time, Moscow has to be careful not to overstretch its military capabilities, and perhaps more importantly, its economic capabilities. While a worthy goal, establishing anything beyond search and rescue at Amderma and other similar areas seems unrealistic at this time. Affordability of these projects is essential, and they seem to be out of Moscow’s price range.
Ian Litschko holds a Masters in Politics and Economics in Eurasia from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and is currently working on his second Masters in Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. He is currently researching Russian military doctrine and Arctic security.
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