When pundits and analysts say that Russia is seeking great power status, what they really mean is the former Soviet Union’s superpower status. Russia is, by and large, a great power, at least by strict definition - it maintains vast territory with considerable resources, it is able to exert considerable power among other sovereign states, even if only on a regional level, and other powers and outside actors acknowledge that Russia is indeed a dominant player in its region and maintains a certain capability for global engagement and influence.
While these capabilities and means of influence may be disagreeable to outside actors, that does not mean that the capabilities and influence do not exist.
Indeed, Russia’s actions in Syria - defining terms of military capability by other outside actors, providing necessary resources for Assad and his troops, and conducting diplomatic engagements with other actors, such as the oil production freeze agreement with Assad’s rival Saudi Arabia - proves that on a regional scale, Russia certainly is a great power.
However, Russia’s goal is superpower status, which the Soviet Union used to command and the United States currently commands. It used to be that nuclear weapons were the key, but North Korea and Pakistan prove that it takes a lot more work to obtain superpower status than simply holding nuclear weapons. Russia understands that the ability to dictate terms on a global level is what constitutes a superpower.
The issue then becomes, how does a state with little political capital amongst global players rise to a position where it can dictate terms? The United States gained this capital through investment and soft power mechanisms, but, with Russia’s economy in its current state, the Kremlin does not have this option. Rather, Moscow is forced to play spoiler, i.e. become a part of the problem, become recognized for such, and then position itself as the only means of developing a solution - referred to as the so called “Syria template”.
Unfortunately for the Kremlin, over the long term, such behavior only decreases political capital, and creates an environment where no one believes the Kremlin’s words because its words are so different its actions. Therefore, the Kremlin must choose between playing permanent spoiler or developing political capital - it cannot do both simultaneously over the long term. Superpowers should not have to stoop to the level of spoiler just to achieve diplomatic recognition.
For example, the Kremlin flexed its muscles in Syria, which diverted attention from Ukraine. However, while news agencies may have turned away from the daily fighting in east Ukraine, local observers and governments did not. Therefore, the Russia’s breakthrough diplomacy in securing the Syrian ceasefire has not led to any special considerations regarding a lessening of sanctions. Governments continue to associate the sanctions with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and are not swayed by actions in an unrelated conflict.
Thus, when the upcoming wave of Russian diplomatic engagement inevitably dies down and the Kremlin finds that other actors continue to distrust her words by watching her actions, what will Moscow do? While Syria won Russia a seat at the negotiation table, what happens if an agreement is reached and diplomatic engagement is no longer necessary?
Already, there has been no significant withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Syria, so Putin’s words on Russia’s “mission accomplished” seem rather hollow, at least assuming that the original mission was, indeed, to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which does not appear so. Thus, hollow words are likely to lead to greater loss of political capital, which would force the Kremlin into another instance of playing spoiler, rather than constructively engaging diplomatically from the outset. Constructive diplomatic engagement invites observers to recognize it as such - as a great power’s constructive diplomatic clout grows, other states, including superpowers, will be more willing to enter into such diplomatic engagement.
Furthermore, if there is another major crisis that pops up in the next year, and the US and EU do not initially invite Russia to the “negotiating table”, or Russia rejects the terms out of hand while proposing terms that the US and EU will certainly not agree to, does that mean that Russia will meddle in that conflict just to be included? The Syrian template is simply not sustainable, especially with Russia’s economy in its current condition, which does not appear to be in a position to recover any time soon.
Unfortunately, the answer to these question does not necessarily lie in the Kremlin’s search for superpower status and renewed glory, but in the Kremlin’s obsession with proving to the Russian population that such superpower status and renewed glory have been achieved.
Many have made the argument that military engagement in Syria is all part of a grand propaganda exercise to convince ordinary Russians that their country to acting morally to prevent the spread of extremist terrorism and upset the role of the evil West. And it has worked - most ordinary Russians know that the the Air Force was waging a victorious battle against extremism in Syria and they know that Russia has not achieved its “rightful” place at the negotiating table.
One instance, or even a handful of instances, of diplomatic negotiations does not equal a return to superpower status. Yes, Russia is a great power, at least on the regional scale, with its size, resources, influence, and recognition, but on a global scale, she remains a spoiler who can only get what she wants via lies, duplicity, and, apparently, military action. In the end, the Russian economy will have the final word on this issue, and right now Russia’s economic potential is not that of a superpower, but merely a shell of its former self.
Blake Holley holds a Masters in Governance and Global Affairs from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and currently works as an intelligence analyst and specialist on Eurasian security issues based in Atlanta, Georgia. His primary focus is on North Caucasus terrorism and strategic forecasting.
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