Treason is a powerful word. It invokes a sense of distrust in the person, their distaste for country and readiness to betray their home. This is, at least, the common understanding of treason and one that the Russian government recognizes. However, they have also accepted a more troublesome understanding, one that more simply believes disagreeing with the state or doing your job can be viewed as treasonous.
Before continuing, there is an important caveat here: we in the West do not have the information on those whom Russia has accused of treason that the Russian government does. There may very well be real grounds under Russian law to some of these cases, however controversial or seemingly absurd they are in the eyes of the West.
In October 2013, the Russian government adopted legislation concerning treason that, in the simplest possible terms, labels anyone that can be considered mildly inconvenient to the Kremlin as treasonous, so long as logic can be twisted to fit the narrative. After all, the law does require that the treasonous individual be conducting activities with foreign governments or agents who pose a threat to Russian security.
While this was originally a thorn in the side of the Russian NGO community with the FSB’s rationale being that foreign intelligence organizations used such groups as cover to gather intelligence on Russia, necessitating the labelling of NGOs as ‘foreign agents’ (see my post on Foreign Agents in the Far North for more), the issue has grown beyond the NGO community. Shortly after the new law on treason came into effect, Russian academic Ivan Moseev was accused of working with Norwegian intelligence to destabilize the Arkhangelsk area by inciting ethnic discord. The allegations came from his reportedly calling ethnic Russians ‘scum’ on an Arkhangelsk-based news outlet, which was denied by Moseev and dismissed by his colleagues. The government eventually dropped the treason charges, though Moseeve was charged under Article 281 part 1 of the Russian Criminal Code for the derogation of a group of people for nationality or origin in mass media.
While it is unfortunate that Moseev has had to endure the brunt of the Russian security service pressure, his trial led to a rather interesting event. Outside the courthouse, self-styled patriots rallied, carrying signs calling the Pomor population (small indigenous group to Northern Russia and Norway), the group whom Moseev has spent his career studying, separatists and traitors to Russia’s national interests.
This is but one an example of what can happen when the term treason is used. Gennady Kravstov, Svetlana Davydova, and Natalyia Sharina’s stories are all quite recent and well documented. The focus of these stories in the West has had a tendency to concentrate on the heavy handedness, the injustice, and the law itself. Of course, that is exactly what this law does - it provides the impetus for the state to crack down on perceived problems and dissenting voices, rallying the population behind state actions performed in the defence of national security.
With the influence that the power ministries in Russia have under Putin, it is reasonable to see control over discourse as the direction the state has taken, though it is important to again note that the law is from 2012. It predates events in Ukraine and its increased usage since then. Drawing attention back to the Moseev case, particularly the events outside of the courthouse, we see how the words treason and traitor can bring out “patriots” in support of the state.
Take this idea of dividing the country into traitors and patriots and it can be seen as providing a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach, to providing scapegoats and drawing attention away from otherwise serious problems in the country. When the economy is declining and many people are beginning to realize that their pensions are running dry, the state parading a traitor who told the Ukrainians about troop movements through the media is a great way to deflect. By playing to an overwhelmingly patriotic population, the portrayal of individuals as traitors is able to maintain support, despite problems that would otherwise cause problems. It demonstrates the strength of the state looking out for Russia’s interests, if not for the wellbeing of its people.
Treason charges certainly lack subtlety. Targeting NGOs and people who are inconvenient is a rather blatant way with which to retain support and a well timed treason charge can help swing support back to the government. Control is everything to the Kremlin. Feeding fears of an encroaching NATO, of a West that looks down on the great power status of Russia, helps keep Putin and his people in power.
Charging citizens for betraying their country, whether true or not, acts as fuel for the fire, keeping patriotic fervour strong within Russia. It is not just and certainly not democratic, but it is what is, at this point, expected of the Putin administration. State security trumps all, civil liberties are at the wayside and economic modernization a distant hope.
Ian Litschko holds a Masters in Politics and Economics in Eurasia from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and is currently working on his second Masters in Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. He is currently researching Russian military doctrine and Arctic security.
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